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Brown v. GNC Corp.: The Fourth Circuit’s New 
Standard for Literal Falsity 
INTRODUCTION  
What does it mean for an advertisement to be literally false? Does the advertisement 
need to actually deceive the public or does the advertisement have to be literally false 
on its face? Federal courts have consistently held that, under the Lanham Act,1 to 
show that an advertisement is literally false, a plaintiff is not required to prove that 
an advertisement actually deceived customers, or that it was likely to do so, if the 
advertisement is literally or actually false.2 However, if it is not clear whether the 
advertising statement is false, then the plaintiff must prove that it misled or deceived 
consumers.3 The difference between literal falsity and misleading advertisements has 
been articulated in various false advertising claims jurisprudence.4 Nonetheless, in 
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 1.  The Lanham Act is a federal statute that grants protection for trademark and unfair competition. 
 2.  See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir. Ill. 1996) (“The general rule is that if a statement is literally 
false, the court may grant relief without reference to the reaction of buyers or consumers of the product.); Am. 
Home Prods. Corp v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d. Cir. N.Y. 1978) (“Deceptive advertising or 
merchandising statements may be judged in various ways. If a statement is actually false, relief can be granted on 
the court’s own findings without reference to the reaction of the buyer or consumer of the product…”); Groupe 
SEB United States, Inc, v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 198 (3d. Cir. Pa. 2014) (stating that proving 
literal falsity relieves the plaintiff of its burden to prove actual consumer deception.); PBM Prods. LLC v. Mead 
Johnson & Co. 639 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that when an advertisement is literally false, a 
violation of the Lanham Act may be established even with no evidence of consumer deception).  
 3.  See Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., F.3d 218, 229 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1999), Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed 
Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 153(2d 
Cir. 2007), Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 113 (2d. Cir. 2010), Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. 
Richardson-Vicks, Inc. 902 F.2d 222, 228 (3d. Cir. 1990), Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commer. Co., 288 
F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2000), Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 276 (4th Cir. 2002).  
 4.  See, e.g., Design Res., Inc v. Leather Indus. Of Am., 789 F.3d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 2015), Innovation 
Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E. Inc., 694, F.3d 723, 735 (6th Cir. 2012), Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 
975, 977 (2d. Cir. 1988), Time Warner, 497. F.3d at 153,  Scotts Co., 315 F.3d at 276,  
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regards to literal falsity claims, courts have chosen to apply various tests depending 
on the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.5 
On June 2015, the Fourth Circuit heard Brown v. GNC Corp. (In re GNC 
CORPORATION: Triflex Products Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation (No. II )),6 
a class action lawsuit brought by purchasers of joint health supplements against the 
manufacturer, GNC Corporation (GNC). The plaintiffs alleged that GNC violated 
state consumer laws by misrepresenting the effectiveness of the supplements.7 In 
response to the suit, GNC filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted 
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.8 The court incorrectly found that in order to survive 
a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff in a false advertising suit must allege that all reasonable 
experts in the field agree that the representations are false.9 This ruling unfairly 
heightened the literal falsity standard of a false advertising claim and diverged from 
the literal falsity standard followed by its sister circuits; the third, fifth, and ninth 
circuits have found that the literal falsity standard does not require everyone in a a 
particular field to agree.10 The Fourth Circuit wrongly decided this case and should 
have let a jury decide which experts to believe based on the evidence presented.11  
This Note argues that literal falsity should not be determined by an allegation that 
all scientists or experts agree on a particular predisposition at the pleading stage, but 
rather should be determined at a later stage where both parties are able to present 
evidence supporting or rebutting the issue at hand. Part I and Part II summarize 
Brown v. GNC Corp. and give a brief historical background of the Lanham Act and 
the literal falsity standard.12 Part III explains the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning. Part IV 
analyzes how GNC Corp. changed the literal falsity standard in the Fourth Circuit and 
discusses how this new standard unfairly heightens a plaintiff’s burden in pleading 
literal falsity.13 Finally, Part V concludes that the Fourth Circuit overreached in its 
ruling and arguably created a strong pro-defendant precedent.14  
 
 5.  The various tests that courts have applied depends on whether the challenged advertisement is based on 
test results. See Castrol Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d. Cir. 1992) (“A plaintiff’s burden in proving 
literal falsity thus varies depending on the nature of the challenged advertisement. Where the defendant’s 
advertisement claims that its product is superior, plaintiff must affirmatively prove defendant’s product equal or 
inferior. Where … defendant’s ad explicitly or implicitly represents that tests or studies prove its product superior, 
plaintiff establishes its burden by showing that the tests did not establish the proposition for which they were 
cited.). 
 6.  789 F. 3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015).  
 7.  Id. at 506. 
 8.  Id. at 515. 
 9.  See infra Parts III, IV. 
 10.  See infra Part IV. 
 11.  See infra Part IV. 
 12.  See infra Parts I, II. 
 13.  See infra Parts III, IV. 
 14.  See infra Part V.  
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I.  THE CASE  
A.  Background  
General Nutrition Corporation and GNC Holdings (hereinafter, “GNC”) 
manufacture, market, distribute, and sell joint health dietary supplements under the 
names “TriFlex: GNC TriFlex; GNC TriFlex Fast–Acting; GNC TriFlex Sport; and 
GNC TriFlex Complete Vitapak.”15 These supplements all contain glucosamine 
hydrochloride and chondroitin sulfate (“glucosamine and chondroitin”).16 They also 
all contain the ingredients methylsulfonyl-methane (MSM) and hyaluronic acid 
(HA). TriFlex Fast–Acting and TriFlex Sport also contain herbs like white willow bark 
extract, hops cones extract, and Chinese skullcap root extract.17 Additionally, TriFlex 
Complete Vitapak contains tablets of TriFlex Fast–Acting as well as separate fish oil, 
willow bark, and MSM supplements.18 
TriFlex product labels state that the supplements “promote[ ] joint mobility & 
flexibility,”19 “protect[ ] joints from wear and tear of exercise,”20 “rebuild[ ] cartilage 
and lubricate[ ] joints,” and provide “[m]aximum strength joint comfort.”21 The 
labels also state that TriFlex Fast–Acting provides a 20% improvement in joint 
function and 25–30% improvement in joint flexibility.22 
Rite Aid Corporation (hereinafter, “Rite Aid”) also markets, distributes, and sells 
store brand supplements including: Rite Aid Glucosamine/Chondroitin; Rite Aid 
Natural Glucosamine /Chondroitin; Rite Aid Glucosamine Chondroitin Advanced 
Complex; Rite Aid Glucosamine Chondroitin, Triple Strength + MSM; Rite Aid 
Glucosamine Chondroitin + MSM; and Rite Aid Glucosamine Chondroitin 
Advanced Complex with HA.23 These supplements are manufactured by GNC, which 
is contractually obligated to indemnify Rite Aid for any claims.24 Similar to the GNC 
brand supplements, the Rite Aid supplements contain glucosamine, chondroitin, and 
the same or similar herbs.25 Moreover, the Rite Aid labels also state that they 
“promote[ ] joint health” or that they “help[ ] rebuild cartilage and lubricate joints.”26 
 
 15.  Brown, 789 F.3d at 509. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Brown, 789 F.3d at 509. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 510. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
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B.  The Litigation 
In Brown v. GNC Corp., consumers purchased various GNC and Rite Aid joint health 
dietary supplements in different states.27 The named plaintiff-consumers alleged that 
the supplements do not provide the health benefits stated on the labels and that they 
would not have purchased the supplements but for the advertisement on the labels.28  
The plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against GNC and Rite Aid under the 
consumer protection laws of their states including various false and deceptive 
business practices claims.29 
The plaintiffs alleged that the advertisements on the labels of the supplements were 
false because many scientific studies indicate that glucosamine and chondroitin do 
not provide the promised health benefits.30 The plaintiffs cited to peer-reviewed 
published studies that show that “glucosamine and chondroitin[ ] are ineffective at 
treating the symptoms of osteoarthritis, whether taken alone or in combination with 
each other,”31 and that “glucosamine, chondroitin, or both are no more effective than 
a placebo in relieving the symptoms of arthritis.”32 The plaintiffs also cited studies 
that showed that MSM was no more effective than a placebo in relieving the 
symptoms of knee arthritis.33 Nonetheless, Rite Aid and GNC moved to dismiss the 
claim stating that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the advertisements were literally 
false.34  
The District Court for the District of Maryland granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss (initial order), holding that the plaintiffs did not plead that “any reasonable 
expert would conclude from the cited studies that glucosamine and chondroitin are 
ineffective in non-arthritic consumers.”35  Additionally, the Court found that a 
manufacturer could not be liable for false advertising as long as at least one qualified 
 
 27.  Brown, 789 F.3d at 510. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. Plaintiffs filed suit under California’s Unfair Competition Law (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 
(West 2006)) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CAL CIV. CODE § 1750) (West 2006)) and Illinois Consumer 
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, (815 ILCS 505/1). Id. at 511. Plaintiffs also filed suit under the Florida 
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, (FLA. STAT. § 501.201), Ohio breach of express warranty under Ohio’s 
UCC, (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.26 9 (West 2006)), New York’s deceptive business practices statute, (N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (West, 2006)), and false advertising statute, (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 350 (West 2006)), New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(West 2006)) and finally Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-1(West 2006)).  
 30.  GNC Corp., 789 F.3d at 510. 
 31.  Id.at 510. 
 32.  Id. at 511. 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
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expert opines that the representations are truthful, even if the overwhelming weight 
of scientific evidence is to the contrary.”36   
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ leave to re-file if they could plead that 
“any reasonable expert would conclude from the cited studies that glucosamine and 
chondroitin do not improve joint health in non-arthritic consumers;” however, the 
plaintiffs did not amend their complaint.37 After the plaintiffs filed an appeal, they 
moved for reconsideration.38 In denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration 
(later order), the court reasoned that it would be unfair for lay juries to ban the sale 
of glucosamine and chondroitin because the evidence of their effectiveness is 
inconclusive.39 Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s orders and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted certiorari.40 The Fourth 
Circuit ruled that it could not reconsider the later order due to lack of appellate 
jurisdiction, but it reconsidered the initial order to determine if the plaintiffs satisfied 
minimal pleading burden for various state consumer false advertising claims and 
affirmed the lower court’s order.41 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is a critical provision in regards to unfair 
competition and trade laws. First, this section lays the framework and provisions of 
Section 43.42 Second, this section explains the elements of a false advertising claim as 
well as the difference between a literally false advertisement and a misleading 
advertisement.43 Finally, this section examines how to prove each of these false 
advertising claims.44 
A.  The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act, which Congress enacted in 1946, establishes federal trademark law 
and governs claims for false advertising.45 Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act 
specifically protects consumers against false advertising.46 Under this provision, a 
claim can be made against any person who, in connection with any goods used in 
commerce, makes any false or misleading representation of fact which in commercial 
 
 36.  Brown, 789 F.3d at 511. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 512. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See infra Part II.A. 
 43.  See infra Part II.B. 
 44.  See infra Part II.B. 
 45.  The Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (2012). 
 46.  Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).  
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advertising or promotion misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin” of “goods, services, or commercial activities.”47  A plaintiff may 
bring a claim for false advertising if he or she shows the following: 1) the defendant 
made false statements of fact about defendant’s own product or another’s product; 
2) the advertisements actually deceived, or have the tendency to deceive, a substantial 
segment of their audience; 3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence 
the purchasing decision of consumers 4) the defendant caused its falsely advertised 
goods or the advertisement itself to enter interstate commerce; and 5) the plaintiff 
has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the foregoing either by direct diversion 
of sales from itself to defendant, or by lessening of the goodwill which its products 
enjoy with the buying public.48 
B.  Literally False v. Misleading Advertisements  
The first element in proving a false advertising claim is showing that the defendant 
made a false statement about the defendant’s or another’s product.49 Whether a 
statement is literally false or misleading is a question of fact.50 To demonstrate a false 
statement, the plaintiff has to show that the advertising statement was either: 1) 
literally false, or 2) although literally true, the statement is likely to mislead, confuse, 
or deceive consumers.51 For a statement to be literally false, the statement must be a 
lie.52 Further, when a statement is literally false, the plaintiff does not need to provide 
extrinsic evidence of consumer deception because the court will presume deception.53 
When a statement is true but implies a falsehood, a plaintiff must provide extrinsic 
evidence to show that customers were either deceived or were likely to be deceived.54  
Courts have differentiated between literally false and misleading statements. The 
Seventh Circuit stated that where the statement in question is “actually false, then the 
plaintiff need not show that the statement either actually deceived consumers or was 
likely to do so. But where the statement is literally true or ambiguous, then the 
plaintiff is obliged to prove that the statement is ‘misleading in context, as 
demonstrated by actual consumer confusion.”55 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit 
described a literally false statement as focusing on the plain language while describing 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See C.B. Fleet Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 131 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 51.  The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
 52.  SmithKline, 131 F.3d at 434.  
 53.  United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d at 273. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 971–72 (7th Cir. 1999). See, e.g., Johnson & 
Johnson, Inc. v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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a misleading statement as focusing on how the advertisement is perceived by its 
intended audience.56  
1.  Battle of the Experts in Proving Falsity or Deception in A False Advertising Claim 
A trier of fact must determine whether an advertisement is literally false or 
misleading; thus, both the plaintiff and defendants must present evidence to prove 
that the advertisement is or is not false.57 One way that parties seek to prove that an 
advertisement is not false is through expert testimony.58 This often results in 
competing testimony either affirming that the advertisement is false or that it is not 
false.59 For example, in Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc.,60 the plaintiff’s experts 
testified about studies and tests that showed the plaintiff’s product had no estrogenic 
activity and that it was not harmful.61 In contrast, the defendant’s experts presented 
testimony that supported the advertisement and cited to studies stating that there 
were harmful chemicals in the plaintiff’s products.62 The jury weighed the evidence 
of both experts and found for the plaintiffs, holding that the advertisement was not 
only literally false, but also misleading.63 Additionally, in PBM, the court allowed the 
plaintiff’s expert testimony to be admitted into evidence even when the defendant 
argued about the methodology of the customer survey being used.64 The court stated 
that doubts as to the expert testimony’s methodology are properly addressed by the 
trier of fact and not by the court.65 Thus, the use of expert testimony in false 
advertising claims serves as an important function because “[t]he ultimate success of 
an implied falsity claim almost always turns on the persuasiveness of a consumer 
survey or scientific study.”66  
 
 56.  Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 735 (6th Cir. 2012); see also, C.B. Fleet Co. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 131 F.3d 430, 435 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 57.  Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Lab., 209 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 58.  See PBM, 639 F.3d at 123. The Fourth Circuit has explained that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
governs with expert testimonies in false advertising claims. Id. 
 59.  See, e.g., Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 60.  Id. In this case, the plaintiff, Eastman Chem. Co., manufactured a plastic resin called Tritan and sold it 
to manufacturers of waterbottles and other plasticware. Id. at 233. The defendant, PlastiPure published an article 
stating that Eastman products had dangerous levels of estrogenic activity and Eastman filed suit under the 
Lanham Act for false advertising. Id. at 233. 
 61.  Id. at 238. 
 62.  Id. at 238–39. 
 63.  Id. at 239. 
 64.  PBM Prods. LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co. 639 F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 65.  Id. See also, Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 383 F.3d 110, 121 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding 
that survey’s technical unreliability goes to weight not admissibility). 
 66.  Harold P. Weingerger et.al, Lanham Act False Advertising: The Expert is Key, N.Y.L.J. (July 19, 2010). 
Since Lanham Act surveys are specially designed for litigation, conducted and executed according to rigorous and 
idiosyncratic rules, it is important that plaintiffs hire an expert to create and administer such a survey and to 
testify at trial concerning the survey. Id. 
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2.  Proving Literal Falsity 
Literal falsity is often difficult for a plaintiff to prove because the statement must be 
unambiguously false.67 Additionally, “[t]he greater the degree to which a message 
relies upon the viewer or consumer to integrate its components and draw the 
apparent conclusion … the less likely it is that a finding of literal falsity will be 
supported.”68 Thus, for a court to determine whether a claim is literally false, it must 
first look to see if the claims are unambiguous and determine whether the claims are 
false.69 This sub-section will examine the various subsets of literal falsity claims: false 
by necessary implication, establishment, and non-establishment or independent 
claims.70  
a.  False by Necessary Implication Claim 
A literally false statement can either be facially false when it is directly stated or it can 
be facially false by necessary implication.71 An advertisement that is false by necessary 
implication is when, even though advertisement may not make a direct statement, 
the advertisement is considered in its entirety, the audience would recognize the 
statement as being explicitly stated; moreover, the indirect statement must relay an 
unambiguously false message.72  
There are various examples of false by necessary implication cases. For instance, a 
court found that an advertisement was literally false when it claimed a specific brand 
of motor oil provided “longer engine life and better engine protection,”73 without 
directly mentioning competitors because it drew a comparison by necessary 
implication.74 Also, the Second Circuit analyzed a false by necessary implication case 
with Time Warner Cable Company.75 The court looked at Time Warner’s 
advertisement, which made a statement that “[s]ettling for cable would be illogical”76 
in the context of picture clarity between the plaintiff’s cable television services and 
Time Warner’s television services.77 The court upheld the district court’s finding of 
literal falsity by necessary implication because the claim necessarily implied that the 
picture quality of the defendant’s DirecTV HD was superior to the plaintiff’s cable 
 
 67.  Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 68.  Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 69.  Id. at 199. 
 70.  See infra Part II. 
 71.  PBM Prods. LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co. 639 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 74.  Id. at 946. 
 75.  See generally Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007) 
 76.  Id. at 158.  
 77.  Id. The court explained that that the preceding content included praise for the “amazing picture clarity 
of DIRECTV HD.” Id. 
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television, when in fact it was not.78 The Fourth Circuit has also reviewed the false by 
necessary implication doctrine in Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Indus. of Am.79 The 
plaintiff argued that the defendant’s claim that “some upholstery suppliers are using 
leather scraps that are misrepresented as leather”80 was literally false by necessary 
implication because the phrase “some upholstery suppliers” referred to the plaintiff’s 
products.81 However, the court found that a claim of literal falsity by necessary 
implication was viable only where the plaintiff’s asserted conclusion “necessarily 
flowed from the ad’s statements,”82 which was not present in this case.83 
b.  Establishment Claims 
An establishment claim involves advertisements that explicitly or implicitly represent 
that tests or studies prove the claim.84 To prove an establishment claim is literally 
false, the plaintiff must show either: 1) the defendant’s test or study was not 
sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty that it 
establishes the proposition for which it was cited, or 2) that the test, while sufficiently 
reliable, does not establish the proposition claimed in defendant’s advertising.85 For 
instance, in Osmose Inc v. Viance LLC,86 the Eleventh Circuit classified a claim as an 
establishment claim when the defendant, a wood preservative company, had an 
advertisement that raised concerns about the safety and efficacy of a competitor’s 
wood preservative product.  The defendant’s claims were based on test results that 
 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  789 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 80.  Id. at 498. The plaintiff argued that advertisement’s audience “would have recognized these references 
‘as readily as if [they] had been explicitly stated’ and that the advertisement’s reference to their product was 
“unmistakable” when viewed in the “broader context in which consumers would have understood it.” Id. at 502. 
 81.  Id. at 499. 
 82.  Id. at 503. 
 83.  The court explained that the plaintiff’s argument was confounding and that for the argument to be 
plausible, one would have to follow their “winding inquiry far outside the face of the advertisement, which the 
concept of literal falsity by necessary implication does not allow the court to do Id. at 502. The court noted that 
the greater the degree to which a message relies upon the viewer to “integrate” its components to draw the asserted 
conclusion, the less likely it is that a court will find literal falsity. Id. (quoting United States v. Clorox Co., 140 
F.3d 1175, 1181 (8th Cir. 1998)).  
 84.  BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 85.  Castrol Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d. Cir. 1992). In assessing whether a study or test 
is reliable, “the fact-finder’s judgment should consider all relevant circumstances, including the state of the testing 
art, the existence and feasibility of superior procedures, the objectivity and skill of the person conducting the tests, 
the accuracy of their reports, and the results of other pertinent tests.”  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-
Pond’s Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 86.  612 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). The court noted that the “advertising statements were “tests prove” or 
“establishment” claims. Id. at 1310. 
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they obtained from a third party.87 The court upheld the district court’s ruling88 and 
noted that the plaintiff only needed to show that the tests the defendant mentioned 
in its advertisements did not support the conclusions the defendant drew in regards 
to the safety and efficacy of the product.89 Also, the Ninth Circuit has analyzed 
establishment claims, finding that a plaintiff  “must demonstrate that such tests are 
not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty that they 
established’ the claim made.”90 The court held that a plaintiff could meet this burden 
“either by attacking the validity of the defendant’s tests directly or by showing that 
the defendant’s tests are contradicted or unsupported by other scientific tests.”91 
Thus, a plaintiff can show that an establishment claims is literally false by focusing 
on the defendant’s inaccurate use of testing, not the overall inaccuracy of the 
advertisement.92 The plaintiff has two choices: 1) prove that the cited tests does not 
establish the claimed proposition or 2) show that the defendant did not actually 
conduct the cited tests.93 
c.  Non-establishment Claims 
When an advertisement does not explicitly or implicitly state that a specific claim is 
based on testing or reports, the plaintiff must prove that the advertisement is false.94 
For example, in C.B. Fleet Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P.95, the 
Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s claim, which challenged the defendant’s 
testing and advertising of its product as a better cleanser than plaintiff’s, was not an 
establishment claim because the plaintiff did not expressly contest defendant’s use of 
testing and there was no language in the text implying a test.96 Thus, the plaintiff had 
to affirmatively prove that the defendant’s advertised claim of “comparative 
superiority” was literally false. 97 Additionally, the Eight Circuit further clarified how 
 
 87.  Id. at 1305–06. The advertisements stated that the test results uncovered that the plaintiff’s wood product 
failed to prevent wood decay and that it actually accelerated the decay, which was a consumer safety issue. Id. at 
1306.  
 88.  The district court ruled that the plaintiff’s false advertising claim was an establishment claim and that 
the defendant’s advertisement was literally false. Id. at 1306–07.  
 89.  Id. at 1310. 
 90.  Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997) 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Osmose Inc v. Viance LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011).  
 93.  BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 94.  Id. Non-establishment claims must be proven false by affirmative evidence of falsity. Id. The Fourth 
Circuit stated that a non-establishment claim may be more difficult than merely proving that a test asserted to 
validate the claim is not sufficiently reliable to do so. C.B. Fleet Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 
L.P., 131 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 95.  131 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 1997).  
 96.  Id. at 436. 
 97.  Id. at 435. 
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to prove that a non-establishment claim is literally false. In Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Pharma., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc.,98 the court noted that when a false 
advertising claim states that “my product is better than yours, the Lanham Act 
plaintiff must show that the defendant’s claim of superiority is false.99 However, when 
the advertising states “tests prove that my product is better than yours,” the plaintiff 
only has to prove the tests used are unreliable.100  
3.  Proving Misleading Statements 
Even if an advertisement is not literally false, a plaintiff can still show that an 
advertisement misled or deceived consumers. In order to prove that an advertisement 
is misleading, 
the courts favor testing by consumer reaction surveys, but have also found  
falsity based on their own independent reaction and the reaction of witnesses 
testifying before the court, including testimony based on test results, consumer 
surveys, complaints received, allegations of more than a few instances or 
misrepresentation, and otherwise.101 
Thus, a false advertisement does not have to be literally false for a plaintiff to get relief, 
as the courts want to prevent “clever use of innuendo, indirect intimations, and 
ambiguous suggestions”102 from being shielded by advertising law.103 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Brown v. GNC Corp.,104 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower 
court. The Court found that although the lower court’s test was incorrect in its 
specific formulation, it was correct in analyzing the law of false advertising.105 The 
Court ruled that, “in order to state a false advertising claim on a theory that 
representations have been proven to be false, a plaintiff must allege that all reasonable 
experts in the field agree that the representations are false.”106 If a plaintiff cannot do 
 
 98.  93 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 99.  Id. at 514–15. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 102.  American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978) 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Brown, 789 F.3d at 509. 
 105.  Id. at 513-14. The district court held that “[i]f there are experts who support what [the Companies] say 
in their advertisements, the advertisements are not false and misleading, but the Fourth Circuit found that the 
district court incorrectly referenced Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at 514 n.7.  
 106.  Id. at 516. 
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this because the scientific evidence is equivocal, then he or she has “failed to plead 
that the representations based on this scientific evidence are false.” 107 
The Court first differentiated between false and misleading representation.108 
While the Court acknowledged that every state applies its own tests for determining 
whether advertising statements are misleading, it reasoned that statements that are 
literally false are also necessarily misleading.109 The Court stated that since the 
plaintiffs argued that the advertisements were literally false rather than true but 
misleading, the Court should only focus on whether the representations are false.110 
The plaintiff’s complaint specifically stated that “the vast weight of competent clinical 
evidence, and the overwhelming weight of high quality, credible and reliable studies” 
supported that the advertisements were false.111 Thus, the Court reasoned that by not 
pleading that all scientists agreed that glucosamine and chondroitin were ineffective, 
the plaintiffs conceded that some scientific experts could agree that glucosamine and 
chondroitin are effective.112 Moreover, the Court stated that the plaintiffs could not 
concede that some reasonable and duly qualified scientific experts agree with a 
scientific proposition while simultaneously arguing that the statement is also literally 
false.113  The Court explained that the experts supporting the companies are either 
unqualified or that they reflect a reasonable difference of scientific opinion.114 Thus, 
according to the Court, if there is a reasonable difference of opinion, then the 
challenged representation cannot be literally false.115 
Although the plaintiffs argued that the Court should not resolve a battle of the 
experts based solely on the pleadings, the Court found it did not need to resolve any 
battle of the experts in order to determine whether the complaint stated a claim for 
false advertising.116 Moreover, the court noted that by characterizing the issue as a 
battle of the experts the plaintiffs further highlighted that some scientists do believe 
that the glucosamine and chondroitin were effective.117 The Court further rejected the 
plaintiff’s contention that the holding would create a loophole for manufacturers to 
find any expert in order to immunize the company from consumer fraud action.118  
 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id. at 514. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Brown, 789 F.3d at 514. 
 111.  Id. at 515. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Brown, 789 F.3d at 515. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
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IV. ANALYSIS  
In Brown v. GNC Corp.,119 the Court held that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, 
a plaintiff in a false advertising claim suit must allege that all reasonable experts in 
the field agree that the representations are false.120 In reaching this holding, the Court 
unfairly heightened the literal falsity standard of a false advertising claim and 
diverged from its sister circuit’s findings.121 This decision has ultimately created an 
anti-consumer precedent for false advertising claims. 
By requiring plaintiffs to allege all reasonable experts must agree on a certain 
claim,122 the Court has set a dangerous precedent, potentially allowing manufacturers 
to automatically win in false advertising claims. Before this decision, the Fourth 
Circuit allowed for discrepancies between experts in the field.123  
In PBM, the Court affirmed the district court’s order permitting the expert 
testimony of two experts who conducted a consumer survey and found that the 
defendant’s advertisement was misleading.124 Although the defendant objected to the 
use of the experts, the Court determined that the technicalities of the surveys went to 
the weight of the evidence and not the admissibility.125 Moreover, the Court stated 
that the methods used by the experts were of the type considered by experts in their 
field.”126 Nowhere in the PBM court’s decision did it specifically mention that all 
experts in the field had to believe or rely on the methods used at trial. Rather, the 
court used the word experts, which suggests that some experts in the field had to agree 
with the methods of the survey. 
Additionally, the Court has also cited to Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit decisions 
that support the conclusion that ambiguity in experts is permissible and is for the 
trier of fact.127  Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has also stated that expert testimony 
must adhere to the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 by being both relevant and 
reliable.128 Thus, when the Fourth Circuit ruled that at the pleading stage all experts 
had to believe that a statement was false, the Court moved from the role of an effective 
gatekeeper to an overbearing decision-maker. With this new standard, the Court is 
effectively stating that although an expert testimony may be reliable and may be 
 
 119.  789 F. 3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 120.  Id. at 515. 
 121.  See infra Part IV. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  PBM, 639 F.3d 111. 
 124.  Id. at 118.  
 125.  Id.  at 124. 
 126.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 127.  See, e.g., Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 383 F.3d 110, 121 (3d Cir. 2004),  Eastman 
Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 2014). Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 
1252, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 128.  See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 134 n.1 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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relevant to proving a literally false advertisement, it still needs to pass an additional 
consensus by all experts before it even gets to trial.  
Section 43 of the Lanham Act was intended to address consumer deception;129 
thus, the Court should not have focused mainly on whether “reasonable experts” 
disagree or agree on the literal falsity of an advertising claim. While experts are critical 
in determining whether consumers are deceived, the emphasis should be on the 
consumers that are being deceived and the business competitors that are being 
harmed. While experts can help the factfinder decide whether or not a claim is false, 
a consensus amongst all experts should not be required at the initial motion to 
dismiss stage. By ruling that all reasonable experts have to agree on whether or not a 
statement is false,130 the Fourth Circuit is removing the fact-finding power from the 
jury and putting it into the hands of the judge.  
The Fourth Circuit uses a Third Circuit case to further emphasize its ruling that 
all reasonable experts must agree in a literal falsity claim.131 In Castrol Inc. v. 
Pennzoil,132 the Third Circuit emphasized that the test for literal falsity is whether or 
not the claim is false; if a defendant’s claim is untrue, then it must be deemed literally 
false.133 The majority further states that  
[t]he dissent asserts, however, that a defendant need only establish 
a reasonable basis to support its claims to render the advertisement  
literally true. We disagree. Rather, the test for literal falsity is simpler; 
if a defendant’s claim is untrue, it must be deemed literally false.134 
The majority’s statement thus emphasizes that the literal falsity test is meant to be a 
simple test; thus, while the Fourth Circuit uses this case to explain literal falsity, it 
neglected to mention that the decision also noted that the literal falsity is not meant 
to be a complicated standard at the pleading stage.  
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has also relied on the Pennzoil decision in another 
literal falsity case, Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Indus. of Am.135 The Design 
Resources court also chose to apply the literal falsity standard simply and stated that 
“[a] claim of literal falsity by necessary implication could stand where the contested 
conclusion necessarily flowed from the ad’s statements.”136 Thus, based on the Fourth 
 
 129.  The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (2012). 
 130.  GNC Corp., 789 F.3d at 516. 
 131.  Id. at 514. 
 132.  987 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 133.  Id. at 516. 
 134.  Id. 944. 
 135.  789 F.3d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 2015), 
 136.  Id. at 503. 
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Circuit jurisprudence mentioned previously in this section, it is apparent that the 
Fourth Circuit has heightened its standard for literal falsity claims.137  
By stating that all reasonable experts have to agree that a statement is false, the 
Court also fails to acknowledge that some expert testimony is not always correct.138 
Thus, the Court undermines the fact-finding process and disregards the notion that 
a statement can be false even though a speaker believes that the statement is true.  
Moreover, “a factual dispute is best settled by a battle of the experts before the fact 
finder, not by judicial fiat”139 and that “where two credible experts disagree, it is the 
job of the fact finder, not the trial court, to determine which source is more credible 
and reliable.”140 Thus, since literal falsity is a question of fact, the fact finder should 
determine whether the advertising claim is literally false, and not the judge. This 
means that the question regarding the unanimity of scientific studies should not be 
required in order to survive a motion to dismiss, because it effectively makes the 
judge a fact-finder and not a gatekeeper in literally false advertising claims. This 
effectively makes it easier for defendant-companies to deceive and mislead 
consumers, because plaintiffs will have to make sure that all reasonable experts in a 
particular field agree before they even have a chance to prove their case at trial or they 
must forego their literal falsity claim.  
In Waldrep Bros. Beauty Supply, Inc v. Wynn Beauty Supply Co.141, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[…] business conduct that seeks to . . . gain an 
advantage in the market is not [justified].”142 The Court stressed the importance of 
consumer welfare as a guide for how businesses conduct themselves.143 The Waldrep 
Court is an example of how legitimate business activity must be balanced with the 
protection of consumers. In the present case, the Court failed to balance the welfare 
of consumers and focused solely on the business activity of Rite Aid and GNC. The 
well-being of consumers has not previously been put secondary to business activity, 
but the Fourth Circuit’s ruling threatens the very existence and balance of consumer 
protection laws.  
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s decision poses a substantial threat to consumer 
welfare. Scholars consider advertisements as helpful to consumers because 
advertisements are informational, lower consumer search costs, which then results in 
 
 137.  See supra Part IV. 
 138.  Albert S. Osborn MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY: Reasons 
and Reasoning in Expert Testimony, 490 (West 2006). See also, Brief for of Law Professors as Amici Curiae for 
Plaintiff-Appellants’ Petition 6, Brown v. GNC Corp., 789 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 139.  City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014); See also United States v. 
Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  992 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 142.  Id. at 63. 
 143.  Id. 
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competition in the markets.144 However, with false advertising, the benefits of 
advertising goals are diminished. Instead of seeking to inform consumers, false 
advertising promotes a culture of beguilement and dishonesty. Consumers often rely 
on advertisements for entertainment, services, and to seek out information before 
purchasing a product.145 In the context of advertisements concerning medicine, 
consumers heavily rely on the statements of manufacturers. Due to the sensitive 
nature of medicinal advertisements, and particularly in  this instance,  false 
advertising claims deserve a higher standard than what the Fourth Circuit decided. 
Because of the level of scientific inquiry that often involves medicines and 
supplements, like the ones at issue, the Court reduces consumer welfare to a mere 
procedural issue and engages in the technicalities of all experts vs. some experts. This 
damage to consumer welfare stands in stark contrast to this Court’s stance on 
protecting consumer.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit should not have set a new standard for literal falsity by claiming 
that all reasonable experts in the field had to agree that a representation was false.146 
The Court’s ruling has vast implications because it presents an unfairly higher 
standard for plaintiffs to actually rely on the unanimity of experts in a particular 
field.147 Thus, instead of leaving the issue of whether an advertisement is literally false 
in the hands of the trier of fact, the decision is now left to the judge.148 This standard 
undermines and leaves the very people that false advertising claims were meant to 
protect –consumers– behind.149  
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